“One of the main goals is to break the West’s will to continue supporting Ukraine. Therefore, one of the best responses is to prove to them that this assumption is false,” Grynkewich stated, as reported by Ukrainian state media Ukrinform. He advised that when hybrid attacks occur, NATO members should respond by boosting PURL funding or transferring interceptor missiles for air defense, thereby invalidating the Kremlin’s premise that such coercion works.
This guidance comes at a critical juncture where diplomatic strains between Washington and Kyiv are compounding security concerns. Rumors have circulated that the White House might cut off weapon supplies through the PURL program in the diplomatic fallout following US President Donald Trump’s diesel deal with Moscow. Grynkewich’s remarks contradict these rumors, reinforcing the US military’s stance that sustaining Ukraine’s capacity is central to NATO’s broader defense strategy against Russia.
The urgency of Grynkewich’s message is underscored by a verified escalation in Russian hybrid operations across the continent. Western intelligence services have reportedly warned European defense leaders that Russia is intensifying efforts to assassinate key figures in the defense industry. This follows a series of incidents including an explosion at a munitions factory in Italy, arson attacks on plants in Bulgaria and Estonia, and a failed drone attack on a Ukrainian cargo aircraft at Germany’s Leipzig/Halle Airport, which officials attribute to Russia.
According to a report in the Financial Times, with progress on the battlefield in Ukraine described as a stalemate and Russia’s economy under pressure, the Kremlin has ordered an expansion of sabotage and hybrid operations. The stated objective is to fatally weaken support for Kyiv in the coming months. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio recently described the situation as a stalemate, warning that such impasses end either through negotiated settlement or dangerous escalation, potentially manifesting as sabotage campaigns in NATO member states.
Germany’s Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt characterized the current security environment as a daily reality of hybrid warfare, noting that espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, and covert operations aimed at destabilizing Germany or inflicting direct harm are constant. The European Union’s diplomatic service has echoed these concerns, listing an increasing number of hybrid activities including cyber-attacks, foreign information manipulation, acts of sabotage, incendiary devices, damage to undersea infrastructure, airspace violations, and assassination attempts.
The strategic challenge for NATO lies in the nature of these threats. These operations are deliberately kept just below the threshold that would trigger an open military response, creating a dilemma for an alliance built for conventional flexibility. While NATO has seen significant improvements in spending, with all members now meeting the 2 percent of GDP target—up from only three members in 2014—collective defense structures were not originally designed to address “deniable” hybrid threats. The US still carries a disproportionate burden, accounting for 60 percent of alliance defense expenditures despite comprising 52 percent of its GDP.
Former US Permanent Representative to NATO Julianne Smith argues that Russia’s gray-zone warfare has entered a “dangerous new phase,” no longer remaining effectively gray. She contends that NATO’s response has often been to treat incidents in isolation rather than as a coordinated campaign, leading to a lack of shared threat databases and integrated air, maritime, ground, and cyber tracking. Smith recommends restarting cyber programs targeting Russia and establishing a clearer threat of consequence, noting that invoking Article 4 consultations indefinitely is not a sustainable deterrent.
As Europe grapples with rebuilding military capabilities, the question remains how to respond to attacks that do not trigger Article 5 mutual defense clauses. The Kremlin’s expansion of these operations suggests a calculated risk that the West will avoid direct confrontation. Grynkewich’s admonition to support Ukraine via PURL serves as a strategic signal that NATO intends to absorb the costs of defense rather than yield to hybrid coercion, though the alliance must now determine how to translate this resolve into actionable countermeasures against non-state and covert actors on its own soil.
