While the governments have characterized the pact as a vital tool for improving intelligence sharing and joint investigations, the specific operational measures remain largely opaque to the public. The full text of the agreement and detailed protocols for cooperation had not been released following the signing. Consequently, it is not yet determined whether the deal will establish new digital intelligence-sharing systems, facilitate joint police training, or create mechanisms for prison-management cooperation. This lack of transparency contrasts with the broader political context, where both leaders have publicly advocated for aggressive strategies against criminal networks.
The timing of the agreement is significant, occurring just two days after Costa Rica inaugurated its own new high-security facility, the Centro de Alta Contención y Crimen Organizado (CACCO). Located within the La Reforma prison complex in San Rafael de Alajuela, the CACCO was designed with technical assistance from El Salvador. The facility has a capacity for approximately 5,100 inmates, a figure that represents roughly 20 percent of Costa Rica’s current prison population. Designed primarily for high-security risks, including individuals linked to organized crime and drug trafficking, the CACCO aims to prevent criminal leaders from directing their organizations from behind bars. The first inmates are expected to be transferred to the facility later this month.
President Fernández, who opened the CACCO, described the new facility as part of a “tough-on-crime model” that her government has embraced. “The CACCO will force criminals to face a new model,” Fernández stated during the inauguration. “Costa Rica will become a global benchmark for prison security.” Her administration has identified security as a central pillar of its mandate, responding to growing concerns over drug trafficking and a rise in homicide numbers that authorities link to disputes between criminal groups over market control. In parallel, Costa Rican police have conducted several major operations this year targeting organizations accused of financial crimes and violence.
The deepening ties with El Salvador reflect a broader regional trend. President Bukele’s aggressive campaign against gangs, which began with a state of emergency declared in 2022, has resulted in a dramatic decline in El Salvador’s reported homicide rate. This approach has garnered significant popularity across Latin America, influencing political candidates and policies in neighboring countries. However, the strategy has simultaneously drawn sharp criticism from international human rights organizations. More than 90,000 people have been arrested in El Salvador since the emergency measures were introduced. Human rights groups have documented allegations of arbitrary arrests, violations of due process, mistreatment, and deaths in custody, raising serious concerns about the legal implications of such mass enforcement actions.
During her official visit to El Salvador, President Fernández toured the Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo (CECOT), the high-security prison central to Bukele’s security strategy. She visited cells, medical facilities, and exercise areas, stating that Costa Rica is interested in learning from measures that have contributed to the reduction of criminal violence in El Salvador. However, Fernández was careful to distinguish Costa Rica’s approach from that of its neighbor. She emphasized that while the country seeks stronger prison controls and more effective tools for dismantling criminal organizations, it will maintain its own legal system and commitment to human rights. “Tougher prison controls and respect for legal protections do not have to be mutually exclusive,” she argued, noting the government’s obligation to protect victims and communities affected by violence.
President Bukele, for his part, argued during their meeting that governmental responses to crime cannot be limited to the arrest of individual criminals. He contended that authorities must target the entire structure of criminal organizations, including their leadership, financial networks, and communication channels. This structural approach is the theoretical basis for both the CECOT in El Salvador and the newly opened CACCO in Costa Rica. As Costa Rica expands its cooperation with the United States and other nations on extraditions and maritime interdictions, the new bilateral agreement represents a localized application of these broader security priorities.
The legal and social consequences of these developments remain under scrutiny. While the immediate effect is the physical segregation of high-risk inmates in Costa Rica and the formalization of a cooperative framework with El Salvador, the long-term impact on the rule of law is still unfolding. The primary legal question now shifts to how these operational measures will be implemented in practice and whether they will withstand judicial review. With the first transfers to the CACCO imminent, the facility’s management practices will serve as the first test of the “new model” Fernández has introduced. The agreement with El Salvador, while broad in intent, will require specific legislative or regulatory frameworks to become operational, a process that remains ongoing and subject to public debate regarding the balance between security and civil liberties.
