This diplomatic and legal escalation mirrors a sharp increase in kinetic military operations by the Colombian government in the final months of President Gustavo Petro’s term. In a series of attacks in the north of the country, the Colombian Army and Aerospace Force launched strikes against the group’s infrastructure. In southern Bolívar, an operation described by the Army’s Seventh Division as a “strategic strike” resulted in the death of “Diamante,” a regional commander, in an area rich in gold deposits. Approximately 100 kilometers southwest, in the municipality of Amalfi, Antioquia, airstrikes targeted the “Roberto Vargas Gutiérrez” structure, one of the group’s most active factions. Authorities reported the destruction of two camps, eight makeshift shelters, power generators, communications equipment, and materials used for manufacturing improvised explosives, alongside the deaths of two individuals allegedly linked to the organization.
These operations are part of “Operation Avenger,” the 25th bombing raid ordered by President Petro during his presidency, nine of which targeted the Clan del Golfo. The timing of these strikes is critical, occurring just weeks before the presidential transition and amidst stalled peace negotiations. The “total peace” policy, which sought to disarm the country’s largest armed group, has faced significant setbacks. According to military intelligence and the Ideas for Peace Foundation, the group’s membership grew from approximately 4,000 members in 2022 to nearly 10,000 by 2025. Concurrently, its territorial control expanded from 145 municipalities in 13 departments to 296 municipalities in 17 departments. This expansion is attributed to the group’s evolution into a diversified criminal entity, profiting not only from drug trafficking but also from illegal mining, extortion, human trafficking, and smuggling. Some estimates suggest that illegal mining now generates more income for the group than drug trafficking.
The breakdown in negotiations has been complicated by recent revelations regarding the conduct of former peace commissioner Danilo Rueda. Audio recordings published by Noticias Caracol allege that Rueda made off-the-record commitments to Clan del Golfo representatives, including promises to manage favorable measures such as the suspension of bombings and the removal of military intelligence officers. In one recording, Rueda is heard referencing the “purification” of police and military intelligence agencies, noting the removal of key colonels who had been tracking the group. Rueda has denied these allegations, stating that meetings were exploratory and did not limit the use of public force. However, the timing of these revelations, just days after the presidential runoff election, has intensified scrutiny of the previous administration’s handling of the group.
The political landscape has shifted decisively against the “total peace” framework. Abelardo de la Espriella, the far-right candidate who defeated continuity candidate Ivan Cepeda in the June 21 runoff, has vowed to end all peace processes with criminal structures. De la Espriella issued a one-month ultimatum to armed groups to “organize their submission to the rule of law,” without offering concessions. In response, the Clan del Golfo acknowledged that submitting to state authority was “inevitable” but demanded legal and security guarantees. The group also announced a temporary suspension of extortion activities in over 50 municipalities between July 10 and October 10, a move seen as an attempt to stabilize its position during the transition.
Meanwhile, the legal legacy of the group’s former leadership continues to unfold. Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” the longtime leader of the Clan del Golfo, was sentenced to an additional 30 years in prison in Colombia for crimes including homicide, forced disappearances, and terrorism. This sentence will be served after he completes his current 45-year term in the United States, to which he was extradited in 2022 after pleading guilty to drug trafficking charges and agreeing to forfeit $216 million. As the group transitions under new leadership, including figures like “Chiquito Malo,” its structure has become more hierarchical and politically entrenched, posing a sustained challenge to state authority in Colombia’s most volatile regions.
