The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of South Korea confirmed that it had tracked the launches, offering a crucial technical distinction that state media omitted. According to Capt. Jang Do-young, a JCS spokesman, the missiles appeared to be fired from two distinct types of launch tubes: one from a vertical launch tube and the other from a torpedo tube. “We continuously detected and tracked the North Korean cruise missiles… monitoring their movements before launch, during flight and through the end of their flight,” Jang told reporters in Seoul. He declined to provide specific flight ranges or identify the vessel involved, noting that the military does not publicly disclose all detected North Korean missile movements.
KCNA identified one of the missiles as a Pulhwasal-3-31, a model North Korea previously claimed to have test-fired from land the prior week. The agency characterizes these tests as an assessment of the navy’s combat system readiness and an enhancement of its ability to perform strategic missions. Consistent with previous launches, KCNA asserted that the tests had “no adverse impact on the security of neighboring countries.” U.S. Forces Korea did not immediately respond to requests for comment regarding the specific threat assessment or intelligence gathered from the launches.
This development represents a tactical and operational shift in North Korea’s military doctrine, moving focus from its well-established ballistic missile program to maritime capabilities. For years, Pyongyang has pursued the development of ballistic and cruise missiles designed for underwater launch. The strategic significance of such systems lies in their stealth; submarines operating beneath the surface are significantly more difficult for regional neighbors to detect and track than land-based launchers, potentially complicating early warning and missile defense systems in South Korea and Japan.
However, questions persist regarding the maturity and reliability of North Korea’s underwater launch infrastructure. While the peninsula’s impoverished, heavily sanctioned status raises doubts about its capacity to build complex systems like modern missile submarines, recent state media imagery has suggested progress. Last year, during a tour of a submarine production facility, leader Kim Jong Un observed an 8,700-tonne nuclear-powered missile submarine under construction. At the time, he criticized a nuclear submarine deal between the United States and South Korea, labeling it a threat to regional stability. Despite these claims, it is not yet believed that North Korea has a modern missile submarine in full operational status. The distinction between a vessel capable of sustained, stealthy underwater operations and a platform merely capable of a single, pre-planned test launch remains a critical point of uncertainty.
The cruise missile tests add to a recent series of weapons demonstrations that have intensified diplomatic tensions. In recent weeks, North Korea has conducted live-fire drills, commissioned new warships, and tested various hypersonic missile systems on September 20 and October 3. On Monday, Pyongyang fired two additional ballistic missiles from an area near its eastern coast. This flurry of activity occurs amidst a prolonged freeze in diplomacy. Kim Jong Un has halted all cooperation with South Korea, describing the southern neighbor as a “permanent enemy,” and has rebuffed calls from U.S. President Donald Trump to resume negotiations, which collapsed in 2019. Pyongyang’s position remains that Washington must abandon its “hostile” policy and drop denuclearization preconditions before talks can resume.
The gap between announced capability and demonstrated operational performance remains central to assessing the threat. While North Korea claims these tests prove the reliability of its nuclear deterrent, independent verification of the missiles’ range, payload capacity, and the actual platform used is limited to South Korean tracking data and state media assertions. The recent tests, particularly the use of vertical launch tubes, suggest an attempt to match the operational profiles of conventional nuclear powers, yet the lack of confirmed nuclear integration on submarine-launched platforms leaves the strategic implications subject to ongoing assessment by regional defense establishments.
