The establishment of the NVVH follows a series of constitutional amendments passed by the Tisza-led government with a two-thirds parliamentary majority. These amendments were designed to remove loyalists of the former regime from key state positions, including the presidency and the judiciary. Prime Minister Magyar described the legislative package as “Operation Clean Sweep,” calling it a “crucial milestone in dismantling the Orbán political and economic mafia.” The immediate consequence of these changes was a conflict with outgoing President Tamás Sulyok, a former Constitutional Court president, who retained the power to veto legislation or refer it to the Constitutional Court. Government supporters argued that removing these figures was essential to restoring liberal democracy and preventing the derailment of the new administration’s reform agenda.
While the agency’s mandate is broad, the final legislation incorporated specific judicial safeguards in response to concerns raised by civil society groups. The initial draft, published for public consultation in June, drew criticism for lacking independent mechanisms to review complaints and for failing to subject measures restricting individual rights to judicial oversight. To address these rule-of-law concerns, the adopted law now requires that any measures restricting individual rights be subject to judicial oversight. Additionally, the legislation establishes the role of an internal human rights officer. While this officer cannot overturn decisions or issue binding orders, they are empowered to receive and investigate complaints, review the office’s activities from a human rights perspective, and issue public findings and recommendations.
The launch of the agency is currently overshadowed by controversy surrounding the selection of its leadership. Parliament was tasked with electing the office’s president and deputy presidents by the end of August. Hearings were held for three leading candidates, including Miklós Ligeti, the legal director of Transparency International Hungary, and political scientist Anna Róza Unger. Ligeti argued that the office should focus on legally unassailable asset recovery based on specific cases, warning that legal procedures should not become a “witch hunt” or a tool for political retribution. He emphasized the need for cooperation with other state bodies and stated that the primary goal should be restoring public trust in the state.
In contrast, Unger advocated for a broader historical and political mission, aiming to expose the operating patterns of the former NER regime and prevent its reproduction. Critics, including former MP and anti-corruption activist Ákos Hadházy, have questioned Unger’s suitability for the role, noting that she is not a lawyer. Many observers believed Ligeti, with his legal background, was better positioned to build a legally robust institution. Despite these reservations, Unger was elected as the president of the NVVH on August 28. She has stated that the office’s six-year mandate will be sufficient to uncover “what happened in this country,” although binding legal sentences for past cases are not expected within that timeframe.
The new agency faces immediate operational challenges. Unger is tasked with building a 150-person agency from the ground up. Early investigations have already targeted significant financial anomalies from the previous era, including internal accounts regarding unused pandemic-era ventilators, a taxpayer-funded African military mission allegedly managed by the former prime minister’s son, and billions of euros held in politically controlled foundations. However, the process has been contentious. Those from whom assets are to be recovered have branded the new institution a modern-day equivalent of Hungary’s communist-era State Protection Authority, casting themselves as victims of political persecution.
The divergence in approach between the government’s narrative-driven strategy and the more legally focused vision proposed by opposition figures and legal experts remains a source of tension. While the Tisza government views the NVVH as a tool for accountability and the restoration of democratic norms, skeptics argue that the broad mandate and the selection of a non-legalist leader risk politicizing the judicial process. As the agency begins its work, the next formal step involves the acceptance of the institution’s charter in September, which will formally commence its operational activities. The coming months will determine whether the NVVH can deliver on its promise of accountability while maintaining the judicial integrity required to withstand legal challenges.
