The central development here is a divergence between Russia’s hardware modernization and its operational execution. Since 2010, Russia has invested heavily in upgrading its air power, acquiring approximately 350 modern aircraft, including Sukhoi Su-35S air-superiority fighters, Su-30SM multi-role fighters, and Su-34 bombers. Additionally, an ambitious drive has remanufactured around 110 Mikoyan MiG-31BM/BSM interceptors and a smaller number of Su-25SM(3) ground-attack aircraft. In the Western and Southern Military Districts, which are within range of Ukraine, Russia maintains roughly 300 modern combat aircraft. Analysts had expected these assets to be deployed aggressively, mirroring the heavy use of fixed-wing assets during the Russian military intervention in Syria since 2015. Instead, the anticipated series of large-scale air operations following the initial cruise- and ballistic-missile strikes on the first day of the invasion did not materialize.
Operationally, Russian fast jets have conducted only limited sorties in Ukrainian airspace. These flights are characterized by strict tactical constraints: they are flown in singles or pairs, at low altitudes, and mostly at night. This pattern suggests a primary objective of minimizing losses from Ukrainian man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and ground fire, rather than projecting overwhelming combat power. The immediate military objective of the VKS appears to have shifted from establishing decisive air superiority to limited, defensive survival and opportunistic strikes, failing to support the under-performing Russian ground forces effectively.
Several factors explain this operational limitation. Initial analyses pointed to difficulties in deconfliction between ground-based surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries and air assets, a lack of precision-guided munitions, and a deficit in pilot expertise for precise strikes due to low average flying hours. These factors remain relevant, but they do not fully account for the sustained lack of activity in the invasion’s second week. The VKS has failed to deploy significant combat power, leaving a gap in the joint operations framework that Russia previously demonstrated in the Middle East.
This stagnation in Ukraine has immediate implications for broader European security, particularly in the High North and the Baltic region. In response to ongoing Russian activity, NATO has launched the “Arctic Sentry” exercise in the High North. Concurrently, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has been actively detecting and tracking Russian aircraft operating in the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone. These measures underscore a defensive posture that acknowledges Russian air activity, even if the VKS’ performance in Ukraine suggests significant operational constraints. The contrast is stark: while Russia fields modern platforms like the Su-35S and MiG-31BM, their deployment in Ukraine has been cautious and limited, raising doubts about their readiness for high-intensity, multi-domain operations against a peer adversary equipped with modern air defenses.
Strategic analysts warn that the current situation in Ukraine may not be an endpoint but a precursor to further aggression. One scenario outlined in defense studies posits that if the United States were to withdraw from NATO or significantly reduce its military presence in Europe, the probability of Russian action against NATO territory could increase. In such a hypothetical “cold start” scenario, Russia would likely employ a fully joint operation involving air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains. Indicators of such an operation would include the redeployment of air and sealift platforms, increased aerial and maritime reconnaissance, and the use of special operations forces to precede conventional troops. Military deception, including the use of civilian shipping and diversionary exercises, would be central to such a strategy.
The limitation of the VKS in Ukraine does not negate the threat, but it clarifies the nature of that threat. The inability to achieve air superiority in a conventional ground war suggests that Russian air power is currently optimized for asymmetric or low-intensity conflicts rather than high-end NATO engagement. However, the continued modernization of the fleet and the aggressive posturing in the Arctic and Alaskan sectors indicate that Russia remains a significant strategic actor. The consequences for deterrence are clear: allies must maintain robust air defense capabilities and integrated command structures to counter both the potential for limited Russian incursions and the risk of a broader, multi-domain offensive should the political calculus in Moscow change.
What remains uncertain is whether the VKS’ current performance is a temporary logistical bottleneck or a structural failure in training and doctrine. While the hardware is modern, the human and institutional factors appear to be the limiting variables. As NATO continues exercises like Arctic Sentry and monitors Russian movements in the Alaskan ADIZ, the focus remains on verifying capabilities and maintaining readiness. The next confirmed development will likely be the outcome of these exercises and any further shifts in Russian force deployment in the Western Military District, which will provide further insight into whether the VKS is being reconstituted for a new phase of the conflict or a different theater entirely.
