The Methamphetamine Dispute
The most immediate manifestation of this instability is the wave of violence dubbed “Red Thursday,” which occurred between July 9 and 10. During this two-day period, at least 22 individuals were killed. Municipal Security Secretary César Omar Muñoz and Chihuahua State Security Minister Gilberto Loya attributed these killings to disputes over local drug markets, specifically the methamphetamine trade. According to Muñoz, this assessment was derived from interviews with suspected perpetrators, a conclusion corroborated by Loya’s own intelligence and reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) monitoring security in the region.
However, the dynamics of this conflict are nuanced. The violence does not appear to be a simple territorial dispute over where drugs are sold. Instead, authorities and NGO sources indicate that the group known as La Línea, formerly the armed wing of the Juárez Cartel, is actively suppressing the sale and consumption of methamphetamine. La Línea, along with its ally, the Barrio Azteca, controls a significant portion of the city, including downtown areas and affluent neighborhoods to the east. In these zones, the trade of heroin, cocaine, crack, and marijuana is permitted, but methamphetamine is targeted for suppression.
Experts and officials suggest several reasons for this specific targeting. First, La Línea lacks widespread access to methamphetamine production or supply chains. Second, there is a strategic calculation that methamphetamine use leads to greater social instability, which attracts increased attention from federal and state authorities, thereby jeopardizing the group’s broader operations. Third, methamphetamine is viewed as a “fast-burn” drug that destroys its user base more rapidly than heroin, which allows for long-term customer retention. The southern and southwestern edges of the city, where most recent homicides have occurred, are controlled by the Sinaloa Cartel and its local associates, the Artistas Asesinos (Artists Assassins). The concentration of violence in this area reinforces the analysis that the conflict is driven by La Línea’s effort to suppress methamphetamine consumption in rival territories.
The Rise of Migrant Smuggling
Beyond the drug trade, a second economic pillar is reshaping the criminal hierarchy: migrant smuggling. In recent years, Ciudad Juárez has become a key corridor for moving people to the United States. The profits from this activity have soared to levels that rival those of drug trafficking. Furthermore, the legal jeopardy associated with human smuggling is significantly lower than that of drug trafficking in both Mexico and the United States, where prosecutions for smuggling are less vigorous than those for narcotics.
The first major criminal group to capitalize on this shift was the Mexicles. Historically aligned with the Sinaloa Cartel during the 2008–2011 conflict, the Mexicles maintained a formidable presence in the city’s prison, a key operational hub. By the early 2020s, under the leadership of Ernesto Alfredo Piñón de la Cruz, alias “El Neto,” the group began operating independently. They took control of local smuggling operations, charging between $5,000 and $10,000 per migrant. State analysts estimated that the Juárez human smuggling market alone generated up to $100 million per month, with Loya noting that for a period, this was more lucrative than international drug trafficking in the city.

To mitigate legal risks, the Mexicles employed scores of minors as polleros, or smugglers, to cross small groups into the United States, where they were rarely prosecuted. The group used these earnings to expand its infrastructure, forming the Mexicle Independent Criminal Organization (OCIM) in an area southeast of the city along the US border. The group’s rise to prominence was signaled when US authorities reported that a faction calling itself OCIM-50 had hijacked five trucks belonging to a prominent company heading to the municipal border crossing.
Institutional Response and New Factions
The Chihuahua state government responded to the Mexicles’ growing power by transferring dozens of key members, including El Neto, to other state prisons. This administrative action triggered a violent backlash. In August 2022, the Mexicles staged a riot inside and outside the prison in a failed bid to escape, an event known as “Black Thursday” that left 11 people dead. On January 1, 2023, a second attempt resulted in the escape of El Neto and 30 others, killing 17 people, including guards, prisoners, and civilians. In the days following, police tracked down most of the escaped prisoners, and El Neto was shot dead in Juárez, according to authorities.
Amidst this turmoil, a new group calling itself La Empresa (The Enterprise) has emerged. Its origins remain a subject of dispute among officials. Municipal Security Secretary Muñoz described La Empresa as a breakaway from the Barrio Azteca, while State Security Minister Loya characterized it as a breakaway from La Línea, possibly constructed by former members of the Juárez Cartel concerned about the shifting power dynamics. The emergence of La Empresa, alongside the independent operations of the Mexicles, suggests that the traditional alliances that defined the city’s criminal landscape are dissolving.
The current situation in Ciudad Juárez is characterized by a complex interplay of old and new criminal economies. While the methamphetamine dispute between La Línea and Sinaloa-aligned groups continues to drive localized violence, the broader structural shift is driven by the profitability of migrant smuggling. As traditional cartels adapt to this new reality, the city faces a fragmented criminal terrain where multiple factions compete for control over both illicit drug markets and the lucrative, low-risk corridors of human trafficking. The next phase of this conflict will likely depend on how these groups consolidate their positions and how state authorities manage the escalating instability in the border region.



