The political shift represents a stark reversal from the “total peace” strategy pursued by former President Gustavo Petro. Petro, a leftist who had previously been a guerrilla with the M-19 movement, had pledged to negotiate with all remaining armed groups. In contrast, De la Espriella has vowed to dismantle the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), the transitional justice tribunal established to address the legacy of the conflict. The ELN, founded in 1964, maintains that its members will only lay down arms after Colombia’s political and economic system has been fundamentally transformed. Yerson characterized the earlier demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016 as a surrender “in exchange for nothing,” citing the failure of subsequent governments to fully implement the peace deal and the continued killing of former FARC combatants.
As the state prepares for renewed hostilities, the security environment on the ground is deteriorating. In Chocó, an ELN stronghold, rival armed groups are actively contesting control. Yerson noted that “all of the ELN territories are being invaded by bands of mercenaries,” referring to paramilitary groups such as the Gulf Clan. These groups have been observed stopping boats on the San Juan River to question passengers, signaling a fragmentation of armed control in the region. The ELN and these rival factions are fighting for dominance over the river’s resources, including gold mining operations, and the local population.
Concurrently, a separate but related crisis is unfolding regarding the protection of minors. A recent review of data from the Ombudsperson’s Office indicates that at least 1,500 children have been recruited by armed groups since 2021, with a sharp rise in cases recorded since 2023. Dissident groups that emerged from the demobilized FARC are responsible for the vast majority of these incidents, with more than half concentrated in the southwestern state of Cauca. Indigenous communities, which constitute just 4 percent of Colombia’s population, account for nearly half of all reported cases. Over 30 percent of the victims are children between the ages of 10 and 14, a practice that constitutes a war crime under international law.
The recruitment dynamics have evolved to include digital platforms, where armed groups glorify membership and use private messaging to engage with children. This expansion of recruitment channels highlights the failure of existing protection systems. Despite the legal advancements made by the JEP, such as the recent charging of five senior FARC-EP leaders from the Caribbean Bloc for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed between 1996 and 2007, the political threat to the tribunal’s existence complicates any prospects for lasting stability. The JEP’s ruling in that case attributed liability for a systematic pattern of conduct aimed at territorial control, including enforced disappearance, torture, and the destruction of cultural property.
The convergence of a new presidential offensive, the ELN’s explicit readiness for war, and the collapse of child protection mechanisms places Colombia on the brink of a new chapter in its long-standing conflict. While the JEP continues to document the historical harm inflicted on indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian communities, the immediate future is defined by the potential for renewed violent confrontation between state forces and Colombia’s last major left-wing guerrilla group.
