“De facto doesn’t participate in the CSTO’s operations,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated last week, acknowledging the rift. “What happens next will depend on the nature of the discussions within the organisation.” The political tension is palpable. On November 5, Prime Minister Pashinyan declared that “our interest in the CSTO has run its course,” a statement that underscores a paradigm shift in the former Soviet Union. This move by a nation of three million, currently coping with the arrival of more than 100,000 refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh, represents a direct challenge to Moscow’s traditional sphere of influence.
The core of the dispute lies in the CSTO’s charter, which envisages mutual military aid to member states. During the 2020 conflict, neither Russia nor other member states—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—deployed troops to aid Armenia. Instead, Azerbaijan, which withdrew from the CSTO in 1999, achieved a military triumph using a revised war playbook. Baku’s forces utilized Turkish and Israeli-made drones and Russian weaponry procured for billions of dollars. The outcome exposed a critical gap between the bloc’s theoretical guarantees and its practical capabilities.
This failure was compounded by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Once again, the CSTO proved ineffective, as no member state backed Moscow militarily. Prior to the invasion, the bloc had flexed its muscles in January 2022 when Russia sent peacekeepers to Kazakhstan during street protests. However, subsequent performances in Ukraine have eroded trust. Galiya Ibragimova, a Moldova-based expert on Central Asia, noted that the Russian weapons available to CSTO members are often marketed as “advanced” but are in reality “very old weapons Russia didn’t need.” She argues that Russia’s political and military might has become “a myth even Russian officials and military believe in – not to mention CSTO member states.”
The economic and political pressures on the Kremlin have further weakened its grip. Alisher Ilkhamov, head of the London-based Central Asia Due Diligence think tank, observed that Yerevan’s timing is strategic, coinciding with Russia’s distraction by the Ukraine war and the impact of Western sanctions. “Russia is to a large extent weakened by [Western] sanctions and Ukraine’s military strikes on Russian economic infrastructure, as well as a looming recession,” Ilkhamov stated. For Armenia, whose government has been at odds with the Kremlin since Pashinyan assumed power in 2018, the opportunity to pivot is clear. Yerevan is now seeking membership in the European Union, signaling a long-term departure from Russian-aligned structures.
Across the post-Soviet space, similar trends are emerging. Central Asian and South Caucasian nations are exploring new formats of military interaction, often bypassing Moscow. One such format is the Turkiye-led Organization of Turkic States, which includes Azerbaijan and three Central Asian nations. In late September, elite servicemen from Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Turkiye conducted joint training in Nagorno-Karabakh and along the Caspian shore. Exercises focused on seizing ships, landing paratroopers, and utilizing drones for attack and supply. In October 2025, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan held joint military drills, further consolidating a security architecture independent of the CSTO.
Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s economic powerhouse with a population of 37 million, illustrates the limits of Moscow’s leverage. The country left the CSTO in 1999, rejoined in 2006, and suspended membership in 2012, preferring the role of an “observer state.” Despite Moscow’s verbal dissatisfaction with signs of “disloyalty” from Eurasian nations, Ilkhamov notes that the Kremlin is “so far only limited by expressing its dissatisfaction verbally.” Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev balances his foreign policy by attending high-profile events in Moscow, such as the May 9 Victory Parade, and sending troops to joint drills. However, he simultaneously engages with the West, welcoming US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in mid-October. “No matter how Russian officials hint to Uzbekistan that it would be good to return, it never did,” Ibragimova said.
The geopolitical implications are significant. The CSTO, once the primary security guarantor for the region, is facing a crisis of relevance. As members like Armenia exit and others like Uzbekistan maintain a distance, the bloc’s cohesion is fraying. The only “real” item on the Moscow summit’s agenda, according to Ruslan Suleymanov of the New Eurasian Strategies Centre, is the security situation in Afghanistan, which borders Central Asia. This focus on shared external threats, rather than mutual defense commitments, reflects the changing nature of the alliance.
For Armenia, the decision to step away from the CSTO is a calculated risk, leveraging Russia’s preoccupation in Ukraine and its economic vulnerabilities. For the other members, the “don’t poke the tiger” logic may keep them silent in the short term, watching as Armenia is “demonstratively whipped” for its independence, as Ibragimova described. However, the broader trend points toward a multipolar security environment in the post-Soviet space, where former Soviet allies are no longer bound by Moscow’s security umbrella. The next few months will be critical in determining whether the CSTO can reform its structure or if it will continue to decline as a viable military alliance, with the strategic balance in the region shifting away from Russian dominance.
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