The violence in the waterway has devastated global shipping. According to the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), at least 11 ships were attacked in and around the strait during the week ending November 6, with three of them sinking. The agency recorded 88 projectile strikes since hostilities resumed in early July, cautioning that most attacks likely go unreported. The economic and logistical impact is stark: UKMTO identified 170 outbound and 155 inbound transits in the strait, a volume approximately 65 percent below pre-conflict levels.
Maritime operators have adapted to the danger by altering their routes and tactics. Most vessels traveling with transponders switched on are using the Iranian route to the north. However, many ships continue to attempt the southern route near Oman, keeping their tracking systems offline to shuttle oil out of the waterway. Iran’s naval force claimed on Saturday that a tanker with its transponder turned off caught fire after hitting a mine in the eastern area of the strait. While the US maintains that mines have been cleared, Iranian armed forces warn that tankers and commercial vessels using “unauthorized” routes remain at risk of being hit by naval mines.
Amidst the kinetic fighting, Tehran has signaled a significant shift in its military posture. For years, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) maintained that it limited the range of its ballistic missiles to about 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles) to reassure European countries they would not be targeted. That restraint is no longer in place. IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi stated on Saturday that the limitation has been lifted, citing an order from Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei for an unrestrained military response to any future threats from Israel and the US.
“This limitation has been lifted for us,” Mohebbi told reporters, adding that the IRGC’s aerospace division has prepared “surprising defence achievements” that will be deployed if another wave of major attacks begins. He claimed these systems would “frustrate and fascinate enemies” and solidify Iran’s military authority. Mohebbi also announced plans to unveil another underground “missile city” soon and to deploy some combat systems to public spaces for civilian inspection. Furthermore, he stated that if Iran decides to alter its nuclear doctrine and build a bomb, the necessary preparations will be made.
On the battlefield, both sides claim successes in aerial engagements. Iran’s army stated in the early hours of Saturday that it destroyed a US-made MQ-9 drone using an unnamed new system. Separately, the IRGC claimed on Friday that its air defenses intercepted an MQ-1, reportedly the 16th aircraft of that model destroyed since the start of the war.
While the military escalation continues, diplomatic efforts to prevent total war have intensified, albeit with limited gains. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said he held talks with 12 foreign ministers over the past 48 hours, including top diplomats from Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Araghchi outlined Tehran’s “fundamental positions,” which include seven demands to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and the establishment of regional security arrangements that exclude the interference of super-regional powers. Security chief Mohsen Rezaei reportedly conveyed similar conditions to Russian President Vladimir Putin during a visit to Moscow on Thursday, a trip that also aimed to deliver a message from Khamenei.
Analysts suggest the diplomatic pendulum is swinging toward conflict. Mostafa Najafi, a political analyst close to Iran’s security chief, described the situation as a “constant pendulum swing between war and negotiations” that is increasingly leaning toward conflict. He noted that the historic defeat for Trump and the Republicans in the US midterm elections this week may further complicate the picture. In a post on X, Najafi wrote that the movement of this pendulum will continue, resulting in a conflict whose ending is “much more complicated and time-consuming than imagined.”
Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, identified three factors that increase the short-term risk of war following the US elections. First, the political cost of high fuel prices, largely driven by the war, has already been paid, and there is no imminent political calendar point for Trump to worry about this issue, meaning the pressure to secure a deal will dissipate. Second, pressure from pro-war hawks will escalate as Democrats take control of Congress in early January, constraining efforts to step up the conflict. Third, Parsi pointed to a new psychological element: Trump’s desire for vengeance. “There has been a vindictive element to his calculations in the past weeks because of his anger over how Iran – in Trump’s mind – has ruined his presidency,” Parsi said. The appointment of far-right, pro-Israel hawk Stephen Miller as chief of staff also hints that the administration may not be ready to wind down the war.
Back in Tehran, the rhetoric on state television reflects this heightened tension. On the war-focused program *Be Vaght-e Iran*, presenters and analysts stated that Iranian armed forces had their “fingers on the trigger,” particularly watching for any movement from Israel. One analyst warned, “Our military information about the strategic chokepoints of Israel is complete. If our water, electricity and natural gas is cut off, they will also be plunged into darkness and lack of water. This is not a bluff, but a serious warning.”
As mediators from Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia continue to shuttle between Tehran and Washington, the situation on Qeshm Island remains a focal point of the standoff. The island, recently subjected to US strikes, stands as a physical manifestation of the unresolved tension: a place where the threat of a mine, a missile, or a diplomatic breakthrough hangs in the balance, with the strait’s traffic reduced to a fraction of its former capacity and the world’s attention fixed on the next shot fired.
