The political significance of this development lies in the potential end of Netanyahu’s dominance, which has defined Israeli politics for two decades. Netanyahu’s religious-nationalist coalition has shrunk from 64 seats in 2022 to 53, leaving his Likud party, the largest individual bloc with 27 seats, eight seats short of a majority. Eisenkot’s Yashar party won 21 seats, but his broader opposition bloc—including the centre-left Democrats led by Yair Golan, Naftali Bennett’s centre-right Together party, and Avigdor Lieberman’s right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu—controls only 48 seats. This arithmetic creates a precarious situation where the Arab-led parties, Ra’am and the Joint List, holding a combined 19 seats, possess a potentially decisive role in determining who governs Israel, even as Eisenkot and his prospective partners publicly refuse to rely on their support for cabinet positions.
Eisenkot’s path to power is constrained by deep ideological divides within his own camp. His primary challenge is bridging the gap between his bloc’s 48 seats and the 61 needed for a majority. One viable path involves securing the support of the two ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), which together hold 13 seats. An alliance with both would give Eisenkot exactly the 61 seats required. However, this route demands significant compromise on the issue of military conscription exemptions for ultra-Orthodox religious students, a long-standing point of contention. Lieberman, in particular, has historically criticized these exemptions, though he has recently indicated openness to compromise. UTJ has already declined to endorse Netanyahu, a move that hurts the Prime Minister’s prospects, but it did not rule out supporting him in future negotiations if their demands are met. Shas, conversely, has backed Netanyahu.
Alternatively, Eisenkot could attempt to form a minority government, relying on external parliamentary support from Ra’am and the Joint List. Under such an arrangement, the Arab-led parties would not join the coalition or hold cabinet positions but would negotiate policy concessions in exchange for their votes. This model was used in 2021 when Ra’am joined Bennett’s government, becoming the first independent Arab party to participate in an Israeli governing coalition, though that administration collapsed after 18 months due to disagreements over settlements and Palestinian statehood. Aida Touma-Sliman, a Knesset member from the left-wing Hadash party, noted that recent developments suggest Eisenkot is more willing to compromise with ultra-Orthodox parties over conscription laws than to risk being seen as dependent on Arab support. “He appears much more willing to compromise with the ultra-Orthodox religious parties… than risk being seen to depend on Arab support,” she said.
The stakes extend beyond domestic governance to Israel’s international standing, particularly in the United States. Israel’s reputation has suffered significantly due to the war in Gaza and the conflict with Iran, leading to a historic low in public opinion. US President Donald Trump, on the eve of disastrous midterm elections for his party, announced an end to the $3.8 billion annual military aid package to Israel. Carnegie Endowment senior fellow Aaron David Miller described the US landscape as the toughest any Israeli prime minister has had to navigate, noting that “in the eyes of many, Israel is no longer David but Goliath.” Eisenkot, who is described as less comfortable with the public stage and reluctant to speak in English, faces the task of repairing these diplomatic ties. His persona, marked by a “careworn appearance” and a background rooted in the military and the periphery, contrasts sharply with Netanyahu’s polished image. Eisenkot’s personal losses, including the deaths of his son Gal and two nephews in Gaza, have created a narrative of shared sacrifice that resonates with some voters seeking a sense of normalcy and rule of law.
Another theoretical option is a unity government involving Eisenkot’s Yashar, Bennett’s Together, Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu, and Netanyahu’s Likud. Such an alliance would command 67 seats, but it would require Eisenkot and his partners to abandon their central election pledge to remove Netanyahu from power. For now, Eisenkot’s mandate is to build a “national emergency government,” as he stated on social media. The next few weeks will determine whether he can navigate these conflicting demands—balancing ultra-Orthodox religious interests, Arab political leverage, and the internal cohesion of a diverse opposition bloc—or if Israel will return to the ballot box.
